學術午餐會| 尹妮娜 ：The Effects of Demand-side Policies on the Implementation of Centralized Volume-based Procurement
尹妮娜，韦德体育bevictor人力資本與勞動研究中心副教授。她的研究領域為健康經濟學、實證産業組織、以及創新和知識産權經濟學。她的研究重點是探索醫藥行業的監管和政策改革如何觸發醫藥企業的戰略性行為（包括定價、創新和廣告等）以及由此對患者福利的影響。例如，對制藥業的漸進性創新授予市場獨占期的利弊；新發現的臨床用藥信息如何影響醫生的處方行為；兒童用藥獨占期政策下企業研發行為的反應；兩票制和帶量采購等醫改政策的市場影響。她的研究發表在Health Economics, American Journal of Health Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Economics Letters, Review of Industrial Organization, China Economic Review, and The Oxford Handbook of Venture Capital等。
分享主題：The Effects of Demand-side Policies on the Implementation of Centralized Volume-based Procurement
摘要：Since late 2018, China's centralized volume-based procurement (CVBP) strategy for pharmaceuticals has introduced a pivotal innovation: the promised volume to pharmaceutical firms as a percentage of projected demand. This promise serves as a powerful incentive for firms to reduce prices in exchange for increased market share. The success of CVBP crucially depends on fulfilling these promised volumes. Utilizing comprehensive nationwide data from hospital molecule-level procurement orders between 2019 and mid-2023, this study evaluates how well these volumes have been met and examines the subsequent effects on the market shares of procured drugs, the average prices, and total drug expenditures under CVBP. Our analysis also delves into the demand-side incentives, such as supportive payment and balance policies, that facilitate the effective implementation of CVBP. Results indicate a significant uptick in the usage and overall consumption of winning drugs, coupled with reductions in the use of non-winning drugs and average prices of all drugs, thereby curbing total drug expenditures. We found that supportive payment policies doubled their intended effectiveness, whereas balance policies achieved only a third of this impact, underscoring that financial incentives targeted at patients are more critical than those aimed at physicians for the successful execution of CVBP.
