研讨論文：Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits (ECONOMETRICA. GODFREY KELLER, SVEN RADY and MARTIN CRIPPS. 2005)

主講人：姜渭（北京大學2021級博士）

内容簡介

We analyze a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield payoffs after exponentially distributed random times. Free-riding causes an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with beliefs as the state variable. We construct the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium of the game, followed by various asymmetric ones. There is no equilibrium where all players use simple cut-off strategies. Equilibria where players switch finitely often between experimenting and free-riding all yield a similar pattern of information acquisition, greater efficiency being achieved when the players share the burden of experimentation more equitably. When players switch roles infinitely often, they can acquire an approximately efficient amount of information, but still at an inefficient rate. In terms of aggregate payoffs, all these asymmetric equilibria dominate the symmetric one wherever the latter prescribes simultaneous use of both arms.

點評老師：張志祥、尹訓東、史博文

時間：5月13日 (晚上6：00-8：00）

線下地址：學術會堂712

活動對象：韦德体育bevictor學生

人數規模：30人

主辦單位：韦德体育bevictor