1.研讨論文：Censorship as Optimal Persuasion (Theoretical Economics. Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk. 2022)
2.主講人：姜渭（北京大學2021級博士生）
3.論文簡介
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender’s utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender’s marginal utility is quasi-concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender’s utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.
4.點評老師：張志祥、尹訓東、史博文
5.時間：3月18日18:00-20:00
6.線下地址：學術會堂712
7.活動對象：韦德体育bevictor學生
8.人數規模：30人
9.主辦單位：韦德体育bevictor
