本期主題
An Introduction to Bayesian Persuasion
主講人
姜渭（北京大學2021級博士生）
内容簡介
We review the persuasion game in which the sender can establish a rule for information disclosure, and we explore the belief-based approach pioneered by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In any persuasion game, the convex hull of the sender's belief-based value graph can geometrically characterize the value of optimal persuasion. When the state space is a continuum, we can address cases where both the sender's and the receiver's value functions depend solely on the mean state using the Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2016). Furthermore, if the sender's value is represented by an S-shaped function of the mean state, upper censorship is deemed optimal (Kolotilin et al., 2022).
時間
3月11日18:00-20:00
地點
學術會堂712
點評老師
張志祥、尹訓東、史博文
活動對象
韦德体育bevictor學生
人數規模
30人
主辦單位
韦德体育bevictor
