近日，我院尹訓東副教授的博弈論理論論文”Linear Riley Equilibria in Quadratic Signaling Games“（二次型信号博弈中的線性Riley均衡解）在國際頂尖期刊Journal of Economic Theory （中财AAA類）在線發表。合作者為北京大學光華管理學院翁翕教授、加州理工大學人文和社科部吳凡博士。

1.論文摘要

We study signaling games with quadratic payoffs. As signaling games admit multiple separating equilibria, many equilibrium selection rules are proposed and a well-known solution is Riley equilibria. They are separating equilibria in which the sender achieves the highest equilibrium payoff for all types among all separating equilibria. We analyze the conditions for Riley equilibria to be linear, a common assumption in many applications. We derive a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of linear Riley equilibria. We apply the result to confirm the dominance of linear equilibria in some classic examples, and we show that, in some other examples, there exist previously unknown nonlinear Riley equilibria.

2.作者介紹

尹訓東

本科畢業于山東大學經濟學院，碩士畢業于北京大學國家發展研究院，博士畢業于法國圖盧茲經濟學院，現為韦德体育bevictor中國公共财政與政策研究院長聘副教授。研究領域為激勵理論、博弈論、産業組織等。論文發表于Journal of Economic Theory, The Manchester School, Economic Modelling, Journal of Economics, Singapore Economic Review , The Annals of Regional Science，Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 等國際知名SSCI期刊和《經濟研究》、《經濟學（季刊）》等國内權威學術期刊。

3.期刊介紹

Journal of Economic Theory

創刊于1969年，是理論經濟學領域最受關注的國際頂尖期刊，也是國際經濟學界公認的經濟學九大核心刊物（core journals）之一，其主要刊登包括機制設計、信息經濟學、博弈論、決策理論、匹配理論、金融、市場設計、政治經濟學、宏觀經濟學、貨币經濟學等領域的原創性論文。

4.文章鍊接：

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105733