研讨論文

Information Provision in Two-Sided Platforms: Optimizing for Supply(Management Science.Kostas Bimpikis,Yiangos Papanastasiou, Wenchang Zhang. 2023)

主講人

龔雅娴（韦德体育bevictor經濟學院副教授）

内容簡介

Although information design has recently received significant attention as a tool for shaping consumers’purchase behavior,little is known about it's use and implications in two-sided marketplaces,where both supply and demand consist of self-interested strategic agents.In this paper,we develop a model of a two-sided platform that facilitates transactions between vertically differentiated suppliers and consumers who differ in their quality preferences.We focus on illustrating the potential benefits of optimalinformation provision in managing the supply side ofthe marketplace,including the entry,exit,and pricing decisions of potential suppliers.We show that the revenue-optimal information provision policy often involves delaying the disclosure of information regarding the quality of the available suppliers.Whenthe outside options available to consumers are relatively unattractive,we find that information designcan help the platform achieve a more revenue efficient matching between supply and demand.On the other hand,when consumers have access to attractive outside options,we show that information design can accelerate the discovery of high-quality suppliers,leading to an increase in the platform's total transaction volume.Moreover,in cases where the platform benefits from commission subsidies to incentivize the entry of new suppliers,information design can be used to achieve the same goal while allowing the platform to earn higher commission revenue.Overall, our numerical experiments suggest that the impact of information design on platform revenue,as well as on consumer surplus, can be substantial.

時間

12月26日（15:00-17:00）

線下地址

學術會堂712

點評老師

張志祥、尹訓東、史博文

活動對象

韦德体育bevictor學生

人數規模

30人

主辦單位

韦德体育bevictor

撰稿：龔雅娴

審稿：尹訓東

編輯：沈嘉怡

審核：王穎