研讨論文
Diffusing Coordination Risk (American Economic Review. Deepal Basak and Zhen Zhou. 2020)
主講人
任奕遙
（清華大學五道口金融學院24級博士生）
内容簡介
In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others' previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates.
點評老師
張志祥、尹訓東、史博文
時間
11月14日 (13：30-15：30）
線下地址
學術會堂712
活動對象
韦德体育bevictor學生
人數規模
30人
主辦單位
韦德体育bevictor
撰稿：任奕遙
審稿：尹訓東
責編：沈嘉怡
審核：王穎
