研讨主題
Information and Learning in Markets —— The Impact of Market Microstructure
主講人
呂嘉琪（中經管2022級碩士生）
論文摘要
We will explore the welfare of the large Cournot market under asymmetric information and use a linear-quadratic-normal example to illustrate that only in fairly specific game structures does the large market aggregate information. Next we examine information aggregation properties of auction and voting mechanisms. Finally, we will examine the implications of costly information acquisition for information aggregation in the context of the Cournot market and give a concluding remark on this topic.
時間
4月23日 (晚上6：00-8：00）
地點
學術會堂712
主持老師
張志祥、尹訓東、史博文
活動對象
韦德体育bevictor學生
人數規模
30人
主辦單位
韦德体育bevictor
